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CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE JICARILLA APACHE, 1854

MORRIS P. TAYLOR

NEW

MEXICO'S GOVERNOR David Meriwether departed in late
February 1854, on a private visit to his former Kentucky home. 1
He was little more than on his way when a Jicarilla Apache raid
east of Fort Union foreshadowed a series of difficulties with that
tribe. This paper examines those troubles, their background, and
the reactions to them.
As hunters and food gatherers the Jicarilla Apache had traversed
much of northeastern New Mexico from the Arkansas River on
the north to the general vicinity of present Mora, New Mexico, on
the south; the area adjacent to the Arkansas River is in presentday Colorado. The Canadian River was the eastern limit, while a
north-south line through present Chama, New Mexico, would be
an approximate western boundary.2 In the decade prior to 1854,
however, it does not appear that the Jicarilla ranged regularly into
what is now the state of Colorado,3 and Meriwether's gubernatorial
predecessor, William Carr Lane (1852-1853), attempted to confine them to lands west of the Rio Grande. 4 Contemporary military
opinion regarded the Jicarilla as the most troublesome of the six
Apache groups,5 but Governor Meriwether, as ex officio superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory, also realized that the
Indians often were desperate for food, a condition which he was
unable to alleviate because of lack of money. He was no mollycoddler of the Indians, which he believed Lane to have been. 6
Probably with the best of intentions Governor Lane had furnished
some provisions without official authorization in the expectation
that the Senate would ratify his agreements with the Indians.
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When approval was not received, the Indians experienced considerable disillusionment, and Governor Meriwether spent some
of his per~onal funds for aid in an effort to prevent deterioration
of relations. 7
Officials in New Mexico were concerned about the Jicarilla
Apache not only because of depredations on settlers but also because of their proximity to both the Cimarron Cutoff and the
Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail. In July of 1850, Colonel
George A. McCall, Inspector General of the United States Army,
reported that their "trail crosses the Independence and Santa Fe
Road between the 'Point of Rocks' and the 'Wagon Mound' or
Santa Clara Spring,"S and in November the locale was described
by Indian Agent James S. Calhoun as "that part of the Santa Fe
road which crosses the Rio Colorado [Canadian or Red River]."9
The ]icarilla presence there was always a threat.
A few Jicarilla joined a party of Navajo and Ute in the late
summer of 1852 for an attack on Kiowa and Arapaho, and on their
way they raided around the little Greenhorn settlement east of
the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, where there had been some
white inhabitants since about 1846.10 That was unusually far
north for Jicarilla to appear. More on the home range, so to speak,
signs of their restlessness increased during Governor Meriwether's
administration when help failed to materialize and food supply
dwindled. A Jicarilla-Ute force led by Colorow, a Ute, ambushed
a small detachment of United States troops in what is now known
as Ute Park, near Old Baldy Mountain on the upper reaches of the
Cimarron tributary of the Canadian River. The soldiers probably
belonged to the company of First Dragoons stationed at Rayado
on the Cimarroncito, and their attackers were said to include the
later famous Ute, Ouray (whose mother was a Jicarilla), and
Chacon, a leading Jicarilla chief. l l The Greenhorn raid and the
Ute Park incident underscore the fact that the Jicarilla Apache and
some of the Ute bands had long been associated. 12
Such disturbances in the military Department of New Mexico
naturally were carefully watched, especially by successive commandants at Fort Union (est. 1851), near the eastern edge of
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JiCarilla country. Those officers, because of the post's location near
the junction of the Cimarron Cutoff with the Mountain Branch
of the Santa Fe Trail, were concerned with the safety of traffic
and communication; that preoccupation, of course, involved them
with some of the Plains tribes (mainly Kiowa and Comanche) as
well as with the Jicarilla Apache and their Ute allies.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke was in command
at Fort Union when a report came in of an Indian raid on cattle
belonging to Samuel B. Watrous, purveyor of beef to the troops.
It is clear from Cooke's instructions to Second Lieutenant David
Bell that no one was quite sure whether the raid should be charged
to Jicarilla or Ute. Bell took thirty-five men - a platoon - from
Company H, Second Dragoons, with fifteen days rations and orders to scout beyond and down the Canadian River as far as the
Cinto Mountain. 13 Brevet Captain George Sykes, Second Dragoons, and Second Lieutenant Joseph E. Maxwell, Third Infantry,
accompanied the little force as volunteers. They left the post on
the morning of March 2; three days later their guide (unidentified) found a fresh trail of what he said was an Apache hunting
party. Soon they saw several Indians riding hard on the other
side of a rocky ravine. Crossing to the other side the troopersapprehended a lone Apache and took him prisoner. While he was
professing friendship, they saw the main band hastening away at
a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. Leaving the prisoner
under guard, Bell and his men galloped in pursuit. They crested a
hill and found Apache warriors riding towards them full tilt, bowstrings and shields advanced and ready for battle. They halted
about 150 paces away and the leader of the warriors performed
elaborate movements in irregular curves, beating his shield, assuming fantastic attitudes, and yelling wildly.
Lieutenant Bell called to the Indian in Spanish that the white
men wanted to talk; the Apache stopped his defiant posturing
and dismounted, came forward and shook hands. Although he did
not reveal how he knew it, Bell was certain that he was confronting the Jicarilla band led by Chief Lobo Blanco (White Wolf),
who probably had made the raid on the cattle. The Apache with
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whom he was talking tried to deny this and to blame Chico
Velasquez and his Mohuache Ute band for the thievery. Bell was
not taken in and threatened to seize Lobo and take some Indian
ponies as indemnification. Oddly enough, Bell reported that the
Apache agreed to part with Lobo but not the ponies.
During the fruitless parley two old men harangued the Jicarilla
warriors, who had dismounted. The leader was getting more and
more contemptuous in manner, and Bell suddenly ordered two
of his men to dismount and force the Apache onto a horse. The
maneuver failed, and about twenty of the warriors (the rest had
withdrawn to the rocky ravine and their horses) uttered a great
yell and formed a semicircle about thirty yards from the Dragoons,
outflanking the platoon on both sides. Lieutenant Bell ordered
"draw pistol" and "forward," at the same moment that Captain
Sykes failed in an attempt to dissuade the Apache from forcing
matters to an extreme. Then came Bell's order to charge. The Indians nimbly side-stepped the charge and attacked from the rear.
The Dragoons turned and charged again. The Apache showed incredible alacrity and dexterity in avoiding being trampled, while
they discharged their arrows with great rapidity virtually from under
the galloping cavalry horses' necks. Then they broke and fled
down into the ravines and arroyos which led to the main Canadian.
The Dragoons chased them to the edge of the difficult terrain,
but fear of ambush prevented further pursuit.
Among the five Apache fatalities was Chief Lobo, characterized
by Lieutenant Bell as a "cruel, daring and treacherous chief." The
Dragoons officer took no personal credit for the Indian leader's
death. 14 Two troopers were lost in the fight. Private James Bell
was killed by an arrow, and Private W. A. Arnold died from a
spear thrust. Both were buried on the field of battle. Four other
troopers were severely wounded by gunfire. Of the cavalry horses,
two were killed and two wounded; only six poor-quality ponies
were taken from the Indians.
After sending an express to Fort Union/ 5 Lieutenant Bell
started his force towards that post. They travelled until 3 A.M.
March 6, when their guide lost his bearings. In the morning, at
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the crossing of the Canadian, they received an express from the
fort with the news that an ambulance would arrive within the
hour with Surgeon John Byrne. Still on the return march, on the
morning of March 7, a man approached Bell and told him that
Jicarilla had run off around two hundred head of government cattle on the Canadian about twenty-four hours earlier. His life had
been saved by the fortunate intervention of a band of (Mohuache)
Ute under Chico Velasquez. Then the man pointed to a hill several miles away, saying that the Ute chief was behind it and
wanted to talk. Bell went alone to meet the Indian, who appeared
with fifteen men. They told the cavalryman that five warriors had
been left with the rest of the government herd to help drive it upriver,16 and the chief offered to assist in recovering the stolen cattle. 17 Although Bell made no comment about this unusual Ute
action, Lieutenant Colonel Cooke later described it as "extraordinary."ls
Some people thought that Chico Velasquez and his warriors
really had been in on the raid and had abandoned the Jicarilla
when it seemed to their best interest. When he heard of it, Governor Meriwether said he did not believe that Chico Velasquez
would bring back any of the cattle; rather, he anticipated that the
Jicarilla would subsist on them in some remote place during the
summer. This at least would bring temporary surcease from their
depredations. 19
Lobo's death was a source of elation to many people who' believed that he was the leader of the Apache who had killed Santa
Fe merchant J. M. White and several others in 1849, abducting
Mrs. White, their daughter, and a female Negro servant. The destruction in r850 of a United States mail party at Santa Clara
Springs was also attributed to him. Governor Meriwether expressed
optimism to Indian Affairs Commissioner George W. Manypenny, in Washington, about the long-range effect of Lieutenant
Bell's victory,20 but his opinion was offset by an evaluation of the
past given by William S. Messervy, Acting Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs during Meriwether's leave of absence.
Messervy reminded the Commissioner that until Lieutenant Bell's
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recent victory the Jicarilla had been successful, almost without exception, in their challenges to United States troops, American
travelers on the Santa Fe Trail, and the general population of
northern New Mexico. That was enough, he asserted, to refute
the late Governor Charles Bent's opinion, given to the War Department on November 10, 1846, that the Jicarilla were a "cowardly people."21
Christopher (Kit) Carson, whose Taos Indian Agency was for
Jicarilla, Ute, and others, visited the nearby military post of Cantonment Burgwin on March 25. There he had a council with
eight Jicarilla, including two chiefs. He was told that about one
hundred warriors and their families were camped near the Pueblo
of Picuris, where they were engaged in making earthen vessels,
and that they had not been involved in the raids east of the mountains. Carson recognized the urgent need to procure provisions for
those people, and he recommended that a special agent be appointed to live among the Jicarilla. 22
Carson's conciliatory attitude towards the Jicarilla was in contrast with his feelings about the Ute. Just a few days before his
meeting at Cantonment Burgwin, he told Messervy that the Ute
"should be severely chastised and punished, and to be made to
know and feel the power of the government."23 His statement was
a reflection of the belief that the Ute were manipulating the
Jicarilla and were the brains behind the recent harassments.
The circumstances of the Jicarilla perplexed the Acting Governor. He knew that game was scarce in their country and that
they were afraid to go hunting there because the troops in the
area could not "distinguish the good from the bad." Buffalo hunting on the plains was difficult in view of the hostility of the Plains
tribes. The barter possibilities of their earthenware were very
limited. He estimated that about one-third of the Jicarilla was
alienated. To prevent those near Picuris from joining them they
must be fed. The government's tight-fisted policy made this virtually impossible. One can sympathize with Messervy's near wish
that all of the Jicarilla were at war, which would place full responsibility on the military.24

TAYLOR: JICARILLA APACHE

275

In anticipation of further trouble with the Jicarilla, Brevet Brigadier General John Garland, the departmental commander, issued
orders from Albuquerque for readying and deploying the limited
number of troops at his disposal. Additional men of the First
Dragoons were sent to Fort Union with First Lieutenant Samuel
D. Sturgis and Second Lieutenant Isaiah N. Moore. First Dragoons Major George A. H. Blake, commanding at Cantonment
Burgwin, was instructed to cooperate with Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke in any expedition "against the Apache or other Indians."
And the ordnance officer at Fort Union was directed to supply
Cooke with the arms and ammunition he might need "under. the
present exigencies of the service."25 These arrangements were
made to help check new Jicarilla aggressions and to keep the mail
routes open. From Independence, Missouri, to Fort Union and
Santa Fe a rather tenuous, monthly mail service was maintained
by the men, mules, and wagons of Waldo, Hall and Company.26
This and other routes were given military escorts for the United
States mail when danger warranted. 27
Messervy's words about the prowess of the Jicarilla were
prophetic. Three days later, on March 30, a disastrous blow
was struck against federal troops at Embudo Mountain near
Cieneguilla, south of Taos. The day before the fight Messervy
had instructed Kit Carson to return to Picuris and promise the
]icarilla there, if he were satisfied that they had taken part in no
hostile action, a weekly supply of wheat or corn. 28 But it was too
late. That same day the Jicarilla left Picuris, and Major Blake
ordered that they be followed by Company I and a detachment
from Company F, First Dragoons, sixty men from Cantonment
Burgwin commanded by First Lieutenant John W. Davidson. At
7 A.M. on March 30, Davidson encountered a large force of Indians who sounded the war whoop and opened fire. 29 It was later
alleged that the Indians left with the intention of preparing an
ambush for the troops, who were certain to follow them; it was
also said that some of the Jicarilla who had fought Lieutenant
Bell on the Canadian were among them. 30 At the time, however,
there was no agreement as to whether the Indians actually am-
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bushed the troopers or the latter found the strong Indian position
and stonned it. 31 Certainly Lieutenant Davidson's reputation fares
better if he was ambushed by overwhelming numbers.
For three hours the Dragoons fought against an estimated two
to three hundred warriors,32 a goodly number of whom were said
to be Ute. 33 Unless the number of Indians was greatly exaggerated,
it supports the contention that the Jicarilla would have been lucky
to raise one hundred warriors for such an encounter. Governor
Meriwether reported that they had about one hundred fifty all
told, but they were divided-Chief Chacon's band (presumably
with about fifty warriors) was for an unexplained reason holding
aloof from the others. 34 An official report said that Davidson's force
was "unexpectedly attacked,"35 yet it was the opinion of Kit Carson that Davidson was compelled to attack the Indians by having
his men dismount and charge up the mountain side. 36 Most divergent in the accounts of this fight, however, are the contemporary
statements of casualties among the troops, ranging from Brigadier
General Garland's high of about forty killed to Kit Carson's estimate of twenty-two. Both men had high praise for Lieutenant
Davidson,37 but their words attest more to his gallantry and bravery
than to his judgment. Curiously enough, a modern biographical
sketch of Davidson asserts that he was the victor in the fight, his
command being nearly annihilated later by a surprise attack when
they were plundering the Jicarilla camp.3S Neither Garland nor
Carson made even the faintest suggestion of that. Also, it is interesting to note that Kit Carson believed the Apache had been
driven to war because of the attitudes and actions of the military in
the vicinity of Taos. 39
Military expresses carried the alarm and the alert. Acting Governor Messervy learned of the engagement in that way and so did
General Garland, who was on his way to EI Paso. 40 "To prevent
further disaster," Garland sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel Cooke
to take the field with two hundred Dragoons and an artillery company armed with rifles. 41 But Cooke already knew of the fight;
Major Blake had sent an express from Cantonment Burgwin to
Fort Union, which arrived about 9 A.M. the following day. By
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noon Cooke was on the road with Second Dragoons Company H
and a detachment of. the First Dragoons, units commanded by
Second Lieutenant David Bell and First Lieutenant Samuel
Sturgis respectively. That force was followed later by Company
D, Second Artillery (serving as riflemen) under the command
of Brevet Captain George Sykes. 42
Reaching Taos on April 3, Lieutenant Colonel Cooke remained
there until the next day to incorporate thirty to forty Mexicans
and Indians from Taos Pueblo into his command as spies, guides,
and trailers, with James H. Quinn as captain and John Mostin as
second in command. Another recruit was Kit Carson to serve as
principal guide. 43 Then the total number of men was augmented
by more First Dragoons under Major Blake from Cantonment
Burgwin. In all, the force numbered about two hundred men. 44
Although it is not certain that the Jicarilla chief, Chacon, was
present at the Embudo Mountain fight, he was leader when the
Jicarilla moved into the mountains south and west of Taos after
that encounter. 45 Whatever the internal rifts among the Jicarilla
suggested by Governor Meriwether, they seem to have been
smoothed over, perhaps because of Acting Governor Messervy's
pronouncement of a state of war with all the Jicarilla. 46 And whatever Ute participation there was near Cieneguilla seems largely
to have disappeared in the face of strong reaction, particularly
Lieutenant Colonel Cooke's swift forced march from Fort Union
and resolute pursuit of the Jicarilla through severely cold weather,
winds, and snow in extremely rugged country west of the Rio
Grande. On April 8, Chacon and his warriors turned and tried
another ambush amid a confusion of rocks beside the Rio Caliente,
a tributary of the Rio Chama. A frontal assault and a flanking
movement, combined with capture of the Indians' horses, brought
quick victory to Cooke and his men, whose casualties amounted
to one killed and one wounded. Fleeing into the snowy hills, the
Jicarilla lost ponies, camp equipment, and, in the long run, additionallives from exposure and starvation. Chief Chacon later admitted to five killed and six wounded in the fighting. 47
Further attempt to overtake the Jicarilla was made by a mixed
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force of Dragoons, Infantry, and Volunteers commanded by Major
William T. H. Brooks, who hastened with them northward to the
Conejos' River. There they le~rned from some Ute that Chacon,
the Jicarilla chief, with seven lodges, all on foot, and another chief
named Wherro, with seven lodges and eight horses, had passed
down the Conejos. These Jicarilla were not found, although search
for them was pushed east of the Rio Grande on the Rio Culebra.
Major Brooks and his force returned to Taos. 48
While regular troops and volunteers were chasing Jicarilla in
the country of the Rio Grande, a report from east of the mountains caused considerable concern because Fort Union had been
stripped of much of its garrison. The story was that Indians (unidentified) had attacked the little settlement of Rayado, north of
Fort Union, and murdered everyone there, including Lucien B.
Maxwell and his family.49 It proved to be untrue, but it was
symptomatic of the widespread fear of an Indian war. Acting
Governor Messervy, for example, in addition to his concern about
Jicarilla Apache and Mohuache Ute, was apprehensive of an
alliance of Comanche, Kiowa, Arapaho, and Mescalero Apache. 50
Occasional word drifted into the settlements about the scattered
Jicarilla. A report current in Taos stated that about sixty lodges,
including the remnants of Lobo Blanco's band, were in the Raton
Mountains,5! a complex of Sangre de Cristo foothills and high
mesas, the latter thrusting eastward onto the plains along the present Colorado-New Mexico line. The Mountain Branch of the
Santa Fe Trail traversed them by way of Raton Pass, and they
were the habitat of Jicarilla Apache and Mohuache Ute.
Official opinion in Santa Fe came around to the view that general war existed with the Jicarilla-and to the striking admission
that the New Mexico Superintendency was unable to cope with it.
General Garland gave reassurances that the Jicarilla would be
fully chastised.52 It was believed that some Jicarilla had crossed
the Rio Grande del Norte about fifteen miles below Fort Massachusetts on their way east into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains
and perhaps beyond. Lieutenant Colonel Cooke ordered Brevet
Major James H. Carleton north from Taos to intercept that trail.
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He was to take Companies G and K, First Dragoons (Second
Lieutenants Robert Johnston and Isaiah Moore) and a platoon
from Company I, First Lieutenant Davidson; the force was to have
three weeks rations, including enough beef on the hoof for about
twelve days. 53 The following account of that phase of the campaigns is based mainly on Captain James H. Quinn's diary,54 supplemented by Major Carleton's reports to Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke.55
Major Carleton's regular force comprised about one hundred
men to which had been added Captain Quinn's spy company of
fifteen mounted men and twenty-five infantry. Indian Agent Kit
Carson accompanied the command. They marched north out of
Taos on May 23 (Carleton said May 25). Both Quinn and Carleton are agreed that May 27 was the date when the force reached
Utah Creek at a point three miles below Fort Massachusetts (est.
1852). Major Carleton, in response to a suggestion from Kit Carson, split his force in order to search along both sides of the White
Mountain (Sierra Blanca) for Apache.
Quinn and thirty-six of his spy company were issued three days
rations for the march around the western side of the White Mountain complex and over Mosca Pass in the Sangre de Cristos to the
Huerfano River. That night they camped at the west entry to
Mosca Pass after a thirty-mile march. There they found vestiges of
a thirty-three lodge Apache encampment, but the signs were about
two weeks old. Quinn was satisfied that these Apache were some
of the ones he had pursued with Major Brooks' force in early May.
He described the pass, which they crossed the next day, as not
more than twelve miles in length, with easy grades suitable for
wagons or a railroad. An early camp was made beyond the east
entry on the middle branch of the Huerfano River, where they
waited for the main force.
The bulk of the column with Major Carleton and Kit Carson
moved from the east side of Sierra Blanca to Sangre de CrIsto
Creek, following up it to the well-protected Vallecito of the Sangre
de Cristo Pass and then over the pass, used the previous year by
Captain Gunnison. 56 On the eastern side Carson found a cold
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trail, nearly obliterated by recent heavy rains. Nevertheless he said
it had been made by Jicarilla, probably only three in number. It
was decided to prepare an ambush on the Huerfano River, which
they reached on May 29, to trap any Apache who might be driven
through Mosca Pass by Quinn and his men. But they discovered
the morning after that there were no Indians immediately ahead
of the spy company. Quinn and his men met Carson, with sixteen Dragoons under Lieutenant Moore, at Gunnison's upper
crossing of the Huerfano. They joined forces and later met Carleton with the main column. Quinn described the meeting place as
being "at the foot of the mountain on the Greenhorn road," while
Carleton spoke of it as on "the road that leads through the Sangre
de Christo Pass to the Arkansas River."
That night they made camp at the head of Indian Creek near
Maxwell's Pass, and on the following day the column moved
through it southward towards the Cucharas, a tributary of the
Huerfano River. They discovered another campsite was in that
high mountain valley with evidence of the Indians who had
fought Lieutenant Davidson's force near Cieneguilla. This vindicated Carson's judgment that they were following hostile Jicarilla, and the morale of the men noticeably heightened. The pace
increased as they crossed the valley of the Cucharas. Quinn's company was in the lead, and they halted at a point on the west Spanish Peak57 near the head of the Cucharas and not very far below
timberline. In a grove of quaking aspen they found traces of
another Jicarilla camp; it appeared that the Indians had stayed there
for three days.
From that alpine location the trail led higher through the cleft
between the Spanish Peaks, an extremely difficult twenty-five mile
trip past two more Jicarilla campsites. The date was June I, and
it may be opined that it was considerable relief for horses and men
when they descended into more hospitable country with grass and
timber, where they camped near the head of the Apishapa River,
another southern tributary of the Arkansas. The course of the
next day's march took them over a watershed to Sarcillo Creek,
which Rowed south to the Purgatoire River, itself the longest of
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the southern drainages to the Arkansas. In a grassy valley with
pine groves, hemmed in by sandstone bluffs, they came to Earring
Spring;58 the valley, which Carleton dubbed Dragoon Park, was a
favorite place of the Jicarilla.
Following the length of the Sarcillo, Major Carleton's force
made camp that night, June 2, beside the Purgatoire River. His
report indicates that the Jicarilla trail led from the Sarcillo's mouth
directly across the Purgatoire and into the Raton Mountains,
which at that locale are foothills of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. He figured that they were about twenty-five miles west of
the Bent's Fort road (the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail).
It may be inferred that the Indians, by no~ following the Purgatoire, were trying to make pursuit as difficult as possible. Quinn's
diary says that the camp that night was on a branch of the Purgatoire at the conclusion of a thirty-mile march. The trail had been
getting warmer, and for that reason a very early start was made the
next morning, June 4- They reached the Bent's Fort road through
the Raton Pass about 9 A.M. The time span from "very early" to
nine o'clock suggests that the previous night's camp had been in
Long's Canyon or a side canyon of it, a few miles west of the
road through the pass. The point where they crossed the road was
"about six miles north of the summit of the mountains," meaning
north of the crest of the Raton Pass.
'
Near where the column crossed, fresh Indian signs showed that
th~ Jicarilla had sent scouts back along their trail. When Kit Carson
discovered the footprints, he told Major Carleton that the Apache
would be overtaken at two o'clock that afternoon. The result of his
prediction was, of course, the famous wager by Major Carleton
that, if his guide were correct, the finest hat that the Major could
obtain in New York would be his. 59 From the road the trail led
directly up the slope of Fischer's Peak. It is easy to assume that
this was the Raton Peak, popularly though erroneously known as
Fisher's Peak, which looms over the valley of the Purgatoire at the
northern end of the Raton Pass. A careful examination of source
materials has convinced the writer that Captain Waldemar Fischer,
Missouri Volunteers, Kearny's Army of the West, climbed the vast
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mesa south of the Raton Peak at a point that was commemorated
by his name in the sumpler of 1846. From the data left by Quinn
and Carleton it appears that they went up. present-day Clear
Creek.
A heavily timbered canyon screened the column's approach to
the rimrock. The troops kept themselves concealed among the
trees while Carson and Quinn's spy company, all afoot, cautiously
led them through the jumbled hills at the mesa's base. They
passed a Jicarilla campsite but a few hours old. The last five
hundred feet of the climb was through and over ragged blocks
of slaggy lava, where the ascent had to be in single file and ten
men could have stopped the whole command. Some of the horses
gave out on this arduous stretch. Just before the top was reached,
Quinn and three men were sent ahead, closely followed by Carson and Carleton.
Both Quinn and Carleton said that the mesa was only about
one hundred yards wide where they crossed it, but apparently that
is a too conservative recollection. From their description it is obvious that they reached the top at a place on the big mesa south
of the Raton Peak where it was notably narrower than elsewhere.
Carson took the lead on the flat, grassy summit, and at the opposite edge he looked. into a vast, natural amphitheater, from
which there was a magnificent view across the plains to the north.
Out of it a stream (Frijoles Creek) flowed northward; to the right
were thickly wooded slopes. The Apache's horses were grazing
several hundred yards below, and on the edge of the timber Carson could see twenty-two Jicarilla lodges. It was just about 2 P.M.,
the time of discovery that Carson had predicted. He signaled a
warning to the troopers and sent one of Quinn's men to inform
Carleton that so far the surprise was complete; the camp showed
no sign of alarm. Carleton carefully joined Carson to reconnoiter.
Right in front of them was the only place where a descent could
be made. It was rocky and precipitous, but the horses could go
down two abreast.
The Taos Pueblo Indians among Quinn's meneo stripped for
battle while the Dragoons were coming over the rimrock behind
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them. The noise of the approaching Dragoons, together with a
shout from Carson· to Quinn to charge on the camp, alerted the
Jicarilla at the last moment, but it was too late for them to defend
their position. With his Pueblo and mounted men, Quinn rushed
over the edge and down toward the camp. They fired one volley
and reloaded; by then the Jicarilla had deserted their lodges, and
Quinn's men turned their attention to the Indians' horses, which
three Jicarilla were frantically trying to drive to safety. By that
time the main column was over the rimrock and rapidly advancing
on the camp and the horse herd. Lieutenant Davidson and Company I went down the creek to try to cut off escape from that direction, and Company G, with Lieutenant Johnston, dismounted to
make an advance on the camp. Lieutenant Moore with Company
K was ordered back to the top of the mesa; he moved right along
the edge in the hope of encountering any of the Jicarilla who
might escape on foot from the woods to the mesa top. Coordinating
with that move, Lieutenant Davidson and his men beat through
the woods some four hundred feet below. At the top, Moore's
company dismounted and left four men with the horses. They
descended the cliff with great difficulty, using a tree to get to the
first ledge and then lowering themselves to the bottom by means
of two lariats tied together. The pincers movement failed. No
Jicarilla were driven from the thickets, although by then Lieutenant Johnston and some men had been placed at the top to
intercept any Indians who might be flushed out.
Several Jicarilla were killed in the main assault and thirty-eight
horses captured. The camp had been abandoned so fast that food
was found still cooking on the fires. Dressed skins, dried meat,
horse equipment, and ammunition were there for the taking, but
the soldiers destroyed it all. When Carson and Quinn could find
no trail of the fleeing Jicarilla, most of the troopers were ordered to
recross the narrow part of the mesa to some good grass and water.
Lieutenants Johnston and Moore and about forty men, along with
Captain Quinn and six from his spy company (Carleton said
three), were left concealed among the trees and rocks to kill any
returning Apache. Quinn and three of his men separated from the
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others by about a half mile. One of the Pueblo Indians who could
imitate the whistle of the Apache lured two warriors and two
squaws back to the deserted village. Their approach sounded like
deer cracking dry sticks. Two of Quinn's men fired simultaneously
at close range (fifteen steps), and the other one fired a second or
so later. One of the Jicarilla was killed. Quinn and another man
rushed into the underbrush, following a trail of blood, but they
were unable to overtake the three Apache. The Pueblo stripped
the dead one, whom Quinn described in irritating generality as
"a man in the prime of life well dressed Indian fashion and
adorned with ornaments." The Apache, probably the son of a principal chief, was, according to Carleton, scalped by the Pueblo Indians so that they might dance over the trophy that night. The
small detachment of troopers and spies reached Major Carleton's
camp on the other side of the mesa about nine 0' clock in the evening.
Because the Jicarilla were scattered, without horses to make an
easy trail to follow, Major Carleton decided to head south through
the Raton Pass. He was enticed in that direction by reports that
an Apache chief named Flecha Rayada was camped on the headwaters of Red River (the Canadian). The Jicarilla band was not
found; the only Indian sign was some three-week old tracks high
on Vermejo Creek. There was deep snow and severe cold. The
animals were thin and weak, and the men were showing signs of
dysentery and scurvy. Companies G and K had been in the field
for almost three months. Carleton's command was back in Taos
on June 12. 61
Although hostilities subsided as the Jicarilla scattered to distant
places, there was another clash on June 30, 1854. A patrol 'out of
Fort Union picked up an Indian trail and followed it into the
mountain country along the Mora River. About sixty men from
Companies D and H, Second Dragoons, were led by Brevet Captain George Sykes, and with them was Second Lieutenant Joseph
E. Maxwell, Third Infantry. Both officers were veterans of the
Canadian and Caliente fights. The troop encountered ten to fifteen Jicarilla, who scrambled up the side of the canyon to escape.
In the pursuit Maxwell and four men reached the top first. There
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they were met by a volley of arrows, two of which killed the lieutenant instantly just as he was about to saber an Indian. The
Jicarilla disappeared among the rocks and trees, and the Dragoons
returned to the fort with the body of the fallen officer. 62
Governor Meriwether had come back to Santa Fe a short time
before that skirmish. He conferred at once with General Garland,
who expressed concern that he did not have enough troops to deal
with widespread Indian harassments. Meriwether asked him to sit
down then and there and write an official request for a regiment
of volunteers. That Garland did, and the Governor issued a proclamation in English and Spanish calling for such troopS.63
In a report to the Assistant Adjutant General in New York,
coincidentally written on the date of Maxwell's death (June 30),
Garland said, "The Jicarilla Apaches have been most thoroughly
humbled, and beg for peace."64 That was putting a rather better
light on the matter than the circumstances warranted. Perhaps
some of the Jicarilla were desirous of making peace, but there was
no formal, inclusive effort to secure it. One peace delegation went
into Santa Fe but was turned away.65 And with the advent of
autumn, it was quite clear that bands of Jicarilla still were ranging
widely, the old problem of food supply being a main cause of
renewed depredations. 66
Special Orders No. 63 went out from Santa Fe on October 2,
1854, giving instructions for dealing with the recalcitrant Jicarilla.
Brevet Major James H. Carleton, First Dragoons, was ordered to
take not less than fifty men south to Bosque Redondo (where Fort
Sumner was later established in 1862) and then move northward
up the Pecos River to the settlement of Anton Chico, examining
all possible sites for a military post. If he had the chance, Carleton also was to deal with a small band of Jicarilla said to be raiding
settlers in San Miguel County. It had been reported that they
were headed for the Mescalero Apache country, an objective
which they should be prevented from reaching. Above Anton
Chico the Pecos was to be searched by Company I, under Lieutenant John W. Davidson, loser of the Cieneguilla fight and recent" campaigner with Carleton in the Raton Mountains. From
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Cantonment Burgwin, Brevet Major Philip R. Thompson, First
Dragoons, was directed to move east onto the plains as far as
Point of Rocks, north of Red River on the Cimarron Cutoff of the
Santa Fe Trail. Any roving bands of Jicarilla he might find were
to be attacked unless they were too strong. Major Thompson was
to keep in touch with Lieutenant Davidson via Fort Union. 67 General Garland's orders hardly leave the impression that the Jicarilla
were entirely quiescent.
Fort Union received a new commandant in the person of
Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, First Dragoons, who replaced
Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke on September 17,
1854.68 It fell to the new man to prepare for a spring campaign
against Jicarilla Apache and Ute. General Garland for some
months had been thinking in terms of a strong mounted force.
Fresh horses for the Dragoons had been brought into Fort Union
from the States, and the post's garrison had been strengthened. 69
Then the lethargy imposed by winter settled over troopers and
Indians alike, a condition that generally prevailed until the green
of spring grass relieved the landscape's drabness.
The dormant state was rudely shattered, however, on Christmas
Day, 1854, when a mixed band of Mohuache Ute and Jicarilla
Apache massacred the inhabitants of a small fur traders' post,
Fort Pueblo, on the north bank of the Arkansas River above the
mouth of the Huerfano. That clinched General Garland's determination to take strong action as soon as possible. His regular army
companies were below strength, but the lack of numbers was made
up by the volunteers being enrolled under Governor Meriwether's
recent proclamation. 70
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